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NOTE
UNITED STATES V. PEND OREILLE COUNTY
P.U.D. NO. 1: A SIGNAL CONFLICT BETWEEN




A summary judgment decision is ordinarily not casenote material.
But the denial of summary judgment in Pend Oreille proved a sig-
nificant victory to tribal bedlands claimants averting aboriginal
rights. The decision allows tribes to avoid the presumption of
state ownership of lands beneath navigable rivers, established by
the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, without proving
conveyance by the federal government. Most importantly the
Pend Oreille summary judgment decision illustrates the substan-
tial flaws of the Montana rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this century, states and Indian tribes have
fought a high-stakes' war over title to submerged lands on reser-
vations. Each has won some battles,2 but no decisive victories.
New rulings which appear to resolve the conflict merely inspire
development of new arguments which perpetuate it.
States persistently rely on the Equal Footing Doctrine3 to
* Student, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College; A.M.
1981, University of Chicago; A.B. 1980, Occidental College.
1. The economic benefits of bedlands ownership include control of commer-
cial, industrial, and recreational access. For example, Choctaw Nation v. State of
Okla., 490 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1974), concerned mineral lease revenues totaling
more than 780 thousand dollars.
2. Contrast the Choctaw Tribe's victory in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620 (1970) with the Crow Tribe's defeat in Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981).
3. The Equal Footing Doctrine ensures newly admitted states sovereignty
equal to that of the original 13 states. Because those original 13 states received
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support their claims of riverbed ownership, while Indian tribes,
until recently, put their faith in the canons of treaty construction,
which dictate' that treaties be interpreted liberally in favor of the
tribes." Tribal claimants consistently prevailed on that basis5 un-
til 1981, when the states' persistent reliance on Equal Footing fi-
nally paid off. In Montana v. United States,6 the Supreme Court
ruled that the Equal Footing Doctrine's presumption of state sov-
ereignty over navigable waters takes precedence over the canons
of treaty construction. 7 Many critics viewed the Montana decision
as a knock-out punch to tribal bedlands claims.' However, as this
title to bedlands within their respective borders when the English Crown relin-
quished its interest, the Supreme Court, in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 230 (1845), ruled that title must similarly accrue to all future states.
For a more detailed explanation of the Equal Footing Doctrine, as it effects tribal
bedlands claims, see Comment, Tribal Bedlands Claims Since Montana v. United
States, 6 PUB. LAND L. REV. 119 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1943). In addition, the canons of construction dictate that treaties with Indian
tribes are to be interpreted as the tribes would have understood them at the time
of negotiation, and that ambiguous expressions in treaties be resolved in favor of
the Indians. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
The judiciary created the canons of construction as corollaries to the federal
government's trust obligation to its Indian wards. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 221 (1982). Because of the unequal bargaining position of
the parties to Indian treaties-among other things, tribal negotiators often did not
understand the language-equity required that the courts take extra measures to
protect the interests of tribal claimants. See Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). For a thorough
analysis of the federal government's trust responsibilities, and the canons of con-
struction see F. COHEN, supra, at 220-28.
5. In fact, tribes prevailed in all but one case between 1905 and 1980. See
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 632 (1970); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1922); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905). The lone case to
hold in favor of a state is United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
6. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
7. Id. at 551-52.
8. See generally Arnott, In the Aftermath of the Bighorn River Decision:
Montana Has Title, Indian Law Doctrines Are Clouded, and Trust Questions
Remain, 2 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1981); Barsh & Henderson, Contrary Jurispru-
dence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana v.
United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 627, 675-85 (1981); Note, Montana v. United
States-Effects on Liberal Treaty Interpretation and Indian Rights to Lands
Underlying Navigable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 689 (1982); Note, Riverbed
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Note will illustrate, at least one tribe has managed to sidestep the
punch and counter with a blow, weakening the knees of Equal
Footing. In United States v. Pend Oreille County P.U.D. No. 1,9
Judge Richard Bilby of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington ruled that aboriginal Indian title
supercedes the Equal Footing Doctrine in riverbed ownership
disputes.'0
This Note will focus on the Pend Oreille decision, and its
impact on tribal bedlands claims. A comparison of the Supreme
Court's Montana ruling with the Pend Oreille decision will dis-
close the irony that aboriginal title to bedlands comprises greater
rights than title under treaty. Closer scrutiny will demonstrate,
however, that an inconsistency belies that irony, an inconsistency
that may ultimately prove fatal to Judge Bilby's decision.
II. TRIBAL BEDLANDS CLAIMS UNDER TREATY: THE Montana
DECISION
A. The Montana Ruling
The Supreme Court in Montana ruled that the Crow Indian
Tribe does not own the bed and banks of the Big Horn River,
which flows through its reservation, because the Tribe failed to
overcome the presumption of state sovereignty created by the
Equal Footing Doctrine." The Tribe asserted its claim of owner-
ship under the two Treaties of Fort Laramie, the first of which
constituted federal recognition of aboriginal rights in ancestral
lands." The Court, cognizant that the United States could convey
bedlands in derogation of the Equal Footing Doctrine, 3 neverthe-
less concluded that the two treaties failed to establish congres-
sional intent to do so.' 4 The Court's reasoning suggests a pre-
sumption that the United States held fee title to the riverbed,
Ownership Law Metamorphosed into a Determinant of Tribal Regulatory Au-
thority-Montana v. United States, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 264 (1982).
9. 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
10. Id. at 609.
11. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 553-57 (1981).
12. Id. at 553.
13. Id. at 551, 556.
14. Id. at 554. The Court dismissed the first Treaty of Fort Laramie out-of-
hand, failing to recognize its importance in a potential claim based on aboriginal
rights. Id. at 553.
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unencumbered by any type of Indian title."5
The Montana Court clearly established the dominance of
Equal Footing over the traditionally determinative canons of
treaty construction.10 The Court, however, recognized two ways of
rebutting the presumption of state sovereignty: (1) by treaty-lan-
guage expressly indicating congressional intent to convey the bed-
lands in contravention of Equal Footing;1 7 or (2) by proving that
"public exigenc[ies]" existed during treaty negotiations, which re-
quired congressional deviation from the policy of holding bed-
lands in trust for future states.' 8 Unfortunately for the Crow
Tribe, the Court ruled that the Tribe satisfied neither of the con-
ditions necessary to overcome the presumption under Equal
Footing.
B. The Effect of Montana
Seven tribal bedlands-claim cases based on treaty rights have
been decided since Montana.19 While those cases indicate that
15. Without that presumption, the Court's ruling is nonsensical. If the tribe
already has rights in the riverbed, conveyance by the federal government is unnec-
essary; the government cannot convey to the tribe what it already owns.
16. This is made clear by the Court's rejection of the old metes and bounds
rule of riverbed ownership. 450 U.S. at 554. Under that rule, tribes owned the
beds of all streams flowing through the metes and bounds of their reservations.
See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 628 (1970). The Montana Court,
while distinguishing Choctaw Nation, overruled its rationale. 450 U.S. at 555 n.5.
17. Montana, 450 U.S. at 552-53 (discussing United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926)).
18. Montana, 450 U.S. at 555-56. Specifically, the Court recognized two dif-
ferent types of "public exigency" which would rebut the presumption against con-
veyance: (1) tribal dependence on the river's resources for sustenance, commerce,
and religious practices, id. at 556, and (2) the national peace. Id. at 555 n.5. The
Court used the latter exigency to distinguish Choctaw Nation. Id. A third, some-
what dubious exigency has been added since Montana. In Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 977 (1982), the Ninth Circuit created the "urgency" exigency. For a thorough
treatment of the "public exigenc[ies]" under the Montana rule see Comment,
supra note 3, at 125, 137.
19. The Washington Water Power Co., 25 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N. (CCH)
61,228 (Nov. 16, 1983); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada Enterprises,
Ltd., 713 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324
(1984), reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 2162 (1984); Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Ta-
coma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324 (1984), reh'g
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2162 (1984); United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
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the Supreme Court ruling was not the death knell for the canons
of treaty construction in tribal bedlands claims,20 they do demon-
strate the increased burden placed on tribes by the Montana de-
cision.' Most importantly, ambiguities inherent in the Montana
ruling have engendered considerable inconsistency in decisions
based on similar treaty-language.2" Perhaps these ambiguities in-
spired the Kalispel Tribe to develop its claim based on aboriginal
title, which it argued successfully in Pend Oreille. 8
III. THE Pend Oreille DECISION
A. The Case
The facts in Pend Oreille are few and fail to disclose the
cause of the litigation.2' The United States and the Kalispel In-
dian Tribe brought suit against Pend Oreille Public Utility Dis-
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 423 (1983); United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d
188 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1027 (1983); Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977
(1982); Wisconsin v. Baker, 524 F. Supp. 726 (W.D. Wis. 1981), modified, 698 F.2d
1323 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
20. Five of the seven cases held in favor of the tribal claimant, and of the two
that did not, one would have been decided just the same regardless of the Mon-
tana decision. The five holding for tribal claimants are Namen, 665 F.2d 951,
United States v. Washington, 694 F. 2d 188, Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F. 2d
1251, Muckleshoot, 713 F. 2d 455, and Washington Water Power Co., 25 FED. EN-
ERGY REG. COMM'N (CCH) 61,228. The court in Baker, 524 F. Supp. 726, held for
the State under Montana, but could have reached the same result under the ca-
nons of treaty construction. See Comment, supra note 3, at 127-28. Aranson, 696
F. 2d 654, stands alone as a true product of the Montana ruling. See Comment,
supra note 3, at 132-33.
21. See Comment, supra note 3, at 139-40.
22. Contrast the decisions in Aranson, 696 F. 2d 654, and The Washington
Water Power Co., 25 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N. (CCH) 1 61,228. See also Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 137-40.
23. 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
24. The briefs disclose the precise facts of the litigation. The federal govern-
ment initially brought an action on behalf of the Tribe to recover damages from
the utility for flooding tribal lands in its operation of the Box Canyon Dam. See,
e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Motion to Dismiss the
United States as an Involuntary Plaintiff for Purposes of Phase II at 1, Pend
Oreille, 585 F.Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984). The Tribe then intervened in an ef-
fort to quiet title to the bed of the Pend Oreille River against the state and utility.
Id. at 2. The motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants was in re-
sponse to the quiet title action only. See Tribe's Brief Answering Defendants' Mo-
tions for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. 606.
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trict No. 1 and the State of Washington, alleging tribal ownership
of the bed and banks of the Pend Oreille River.2 5 The State of
Washington and the utility district filed a motion for summary
judgment alleging that the Kalispel Tribe had no interest in the
riverbed.2 ' That motion brought the case before Judge Bilby.
The state argued that the Kalispel Tribe had no interest in
the riverbed because the federal government conveyed no interest
to the Tribe prior to Washington's statehood.17 In response, the
Tribe argued that aboriginal Indian title gave it an ownership in-
terest in the bed and banks, which was not extinguished when the
federal government conveyed title to the State of Washington. 
2
Judge Bilby ruled against the state's motion for summary
judgment, finding that the Kalispel Tribe could have retained an
interest in the riverbed under aboriginal title, despite operation
of the Equal Footing Doctrine.2 9 The court did not, however, rule
that the Tribe had, in fact, established aboriginal title to the
Pend Oreille Riverbed, but left that determination for decision on
the merits.8 0
B. The Doctrine of Aboriginal Title
The court's ruling was based on well-settled principles of In-
dian law relating to aboriginal rights. Aboriginal title vests tribes
with the exclusive rights to the use and occupation of their ances-
tral lands until extinguishment by voluntary abandonment or Act
of Congress.3 1 Those rights are accorded the protection of com-
25. Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 606-07.
26. Id. at 608.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 609.
30. Id. at 610. To prove aboriginal title, the Kalispel Tribe must show actual,
continuous, and exclusive possession of the land in question. F. COHEN, supra note
4, at 492. The continuous use requirement will be satisfied if the land is used
seasonally for specific purposes. Id.
31. Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 609. Voluntary abandonment is a defense to
aboriginal title claims, based on proof of non-exclusive and non-continuous occu-
pation, or a cessation of continuous and exclusive use. See F. COHEN, supra note 4,
at 492. Voluntary removal of a tribe to non-ancestral lands constitutes voluntary
abandonment of aboriginal rights. Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55
(1886). Forcible removal does not constitute abandonment. United States ex rel.
Haulpal Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
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plete ownership against all but the federal government, which has
exclusive authority to terminate aboriginal title. 2 Thus, states
can neither fix the limits of nor extinguish aboriginal rights.
While Congress may terminate aboriginal title, extinguish-
ment will not be implied lightly.38 Treaties between the federal
government and Indian tribes only serve to extinguish aboriginal
rights where congressional intent is clear. 4 Furthermore, Indian
title survives the actions of federal agencies2 6
Where aboriginal title exists, the United States holds a bare
fee to the ancestral lands, encumbered by the tribal rights. 6 Con-
veyance of the lands by the federal government does not auto-
matically extinguish the aboriginal rights. Instead, the encum-
brance follows the chain of title.3 7 When a state enters the Union,
and claims title to bedlands under Equal Footing, it takes only
that interest previously held by the federal government, subject
to any aboriginal rights still in existence.3
The court, in Pend Oreille, declined to adopt the utility's po-
sition that operation of the Equal Footing Doctrine extinguishes
all aboriginal rights, absent evidence that Congress expressly in-
The concept of aboriginal or Indian title derives from the European rules of
discovery and conquest, which recognized native possessory rights to the land. See
1 E. DEVATTEL, THE LAWS OF NATIONS 99-100 (1852). The European government
responsible for discovery held title and exercised dominion over the land, good
against all other European governments, but subject to the Indian right of occu-
pancy. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823). See F. COHEN,
supra note 4, at 486-87.
32. See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946).
The exclusive right of the federal government to extinguish aboriginal title is dic-
tated by the European rules of discovery, recognized in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), and the trust relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the Indians. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 489.
33. United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S.
339, 354 (1941).
34. See Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 609, citing United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
35. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); see also F. COHEN, supra
note 4, at 490. The same logic dictates that aboriginal title withstands executive
orders.
36. Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 609.
37. Id. Conveyance will extinguish aboriginal claims only when congressional
intent to extinguish is clear. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
38. Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 608.
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tended the doctrine to have that effect."' Judge Bilby refused to
imply extinguishment of aboriginal rights lightly, in view of the
historical relationship between the federal government and In-
dian tribes. 0
IV. ANALYSIS
United States v. Pend Oreille County P.U.D. No. 1 decided
the first tribal bedlands claim based on aboriginal rights."' By rul-
ing that aboriginal title supercedes Equal Footing, the court im-
plicitly acknowledged that aboriginal title may comprise greater
rights than a treaty purporting to recognize those very aboriginal
claims."2 The irony in this is illustrated by cases, prior to Mon-
tana" and Pend Oreille, indicating that aboriginal title differs
from title under treaty only in relation to the right of compensa-
tion for a taking of the interest, under the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution."" In all other respects, courts have
held aboriginal title to afford the same set of beneficial interests
as treaty title.
5
The irony of the Pend Oreille ruling is belied by its inconsis-
tency with the Supreme Court's decision in Montana. While the
Supreme Court implicitly presumed that the United States held
39. Id.
40. Id. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. 585 F. Supp. 606, 608 (E.D. Wash. 1984). A similar claim has been made
in Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Nelson, 521 F. Supp. 463 (D.S.D. 1981),
vacated and remanded, 683 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1982), 566 F. Supp. 1507 (D.S.D.
1983), amended, 604 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.D. 1985). In that case, the district court
granted the Tribe's motion for summary judgment on its claim of riverbed owner-
ship. That ruling was vacated on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, where both parties
agreed to a trial on the merits. 683 F.2d at 1162. Before reaching the merits, how-
ever, the appellate court remanded for a ruling on the navigability of the river at
issue. Id. at 1163. The district court ruled that the river was indeed navigable. 566
F. Supp. at 1508. The district court then amended the judgment on navigability to
define the meander line as the boundary. 604 F. Supp. at 1157. The case is now
back before the Eighth Circuit on the merits.
42. This implication is necessitated by Montana. See supra notes 11-23 and
accompanying text.
43. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
44. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
45. See United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938); Oneida
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669 (1974); United States v.
Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946); Mitchel v. United States, 34
U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). See also F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 491.
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full title to bedlands before conveyance,'4 6 the Pend Oreille court
premised its decision on encumbrance of the federal government's
fee by preexisting aboriginal rights.47 Fault for the inconsistency
clearly lies with the Supreme Court."' While Judge Bilby based
his premise on earlier Supreme Court opinions addressing aborig-
inal rights and the axiom that a grantor may convey only that
interest he possesses,4 the Montana Court, by contrast, merely
presumed that some conveyance by the, federal government is a
necessary prerequisite to tribal rights in bedlands. The Pend
Oreille decision demonstrates the fallacy in that presumption.50
The fact that aboriginal rights were not at issue in Montana can-
not excuse the Court's failure to recognize the possibility that
such rights can affect title. The Court must be aware of the impli-
cations of its significant rulings.
Arguments that the Montana Court resolved-albeit un-
knowingly-potential conflict with aboriginal title claims by cre-
ating the "public exigency" exceptions to its rule,5 ' misconstrue
the thrust of those exceptions. The Court found such "ex-
46. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 550-51.
47. See supra notes 28 and 38-39 and accompanying text.
48. Judge Bilby misinterpreted the law after Montana, but only with respect
to treaty rights; the mistake did not substantially affect the outcome of the Pend
Oreille decision. Nor does it cast doubt on the court's aboriginal rights premise.
After finding the presumption against conveyance in derogation of Equal Footing
"inapplicable" to the aboriginal claim of the Kalispel Tribe, 585 F. Supp. at 610,
Judge Bilby stated that even if the presumption were applicable, it would be de-
feated by a "countervailing" presumption in favor of Indian Tribes, under the
Choctaw Nation ruling. Id. The Montana decision, however, clearly demonstrated
that the canons of treaty construction relied on in Choctaw Nation were ineffec-
tive against the Equal Footing Doctrine's presumption of state sovereignty over
bedlands. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
The district court also attempted to distinguish Montana on the facts, assert-
ing that while the Supreme Court case concerned a claimed conveyance by the
federal government, Pend Oreille concerned preexisting tribal interests. Id. at 609.
This indicates Judge Bilby's failure to recognize the inconsistent premises of the
two decisions. Some responsibility for the inconsistency must also fall on the Crow
Tribe and its federal attorneys for their apparent failure to recognize and argue all
the implications of the presumption adopted by the Court in Montana.
49. See Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 609.
50. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Presumably, such an argument
would be based on the similar requirements for asserting either aboriginal title or
title under the "public exigency" exceptions to the Montana rule. On the require-
ments for asserting aboriginal title see supra note 30.
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igenc[ies]" would support tribal claims of federal conveyance."s
Conveyance, however, is neither necessary nor possible in aborigi-
nal title claims. 53 Moreover, the Montana Court implied that a
treaty must accompany an assertion of "public exigency. '54 By
definition, tribal claims under aboriginal title require no support-
ing treaty. 55
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Pend Oreille56 ruling affords tribal bedlands claimants a
means of avoiding the Montana5 7 rule. Before Pend Oreille, tribal
claimants could prevail only under a treaty expressly indicating
congressional intent to convey bedlands, or if circumstances lead-
ing to treaty negotiations constituted a public exigency.5 The ex-
press treaty-language requirement of that rule is especially am-
biguous, making tribal bedlands claims even more precarious. 9
Justice Rehnquist has suggested that nothing less than specific
reference by the treaty to bedlands ownership is sufficient." Con-
sidering that all treaties were negotiated more than 110 years
before the Montana Court decided the specificity required to se-
cure tribal rights, 61 the burden placed on tribes under so narrow a
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
53. This is axiomatic. By definition, aboriginal title is a possessory right pre-
dating European Sovereignty. Any later conveyance by a sovereign to a tribe
would be redundant. See discussion of aboriginal title claims, supra note 31 and
sources therein.
54. In determining whether a "public exigency" exists, the Court will look to
the "circumstances surrounding the treaties." 450 U.S. at 556 n.5. Indeed, in Mon-
tana, the Court concluded that the Crow Tribe failed to prove the existence of
"public exigenc[ies]" because "at the time of the treaty," they were not dependent
on the Big Horn River. 450 U.S. at 556.
55. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 492.
56. 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
57. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
58. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 22 (illustrating ambiguities in express treaty language
requirement).
60. See Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court's de-
nial of certiorari in Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 459 U.S.
977 (1982). There is language in Montana supporting Justice Rehnquist's narrow
interpretation. For instance, the Montana Court rejected an attempt to rebut the
presumption of state sovereignty, absent "express reference to the riverbed." 450
U.S. at 554.
61. The Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, 12 Stat. 512, 528, 25 U.S.C. §
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reading of Montana is virtually insurmountable.
Pend Oreille allows tribes retaining aboriginal rights to over-
come the Equal Footing Doctrine without the burden of proving
the intent of a Congress acting in a previous century. Claimants
must merely prove the existence of aboriginal rights which have
not been extinguished by an Act of Congress or voluntary aban-
donment.62 Unfortunately, the number of tribes retaining aborigi-
nal title today is limited by the voluntary abandonment of most
aboriginal claims during the treaty-making years, when many
tribes voluntarily agreed to relinquish their ancestral lands, in ex-
change for new and faraway reservations.6 3
The conflict between the premises of the Montana and Pend
Oreille decisions should be of concern to tribal claimants. Such
inconsistencies inevitably lead to confusion in the courts, and
confusion, in turn, leads to further inconsistent decisions. Claim-
ants must also be aware that the relative precedential value of the
two cases may lead courts to dismiss Pend Oreille out-of-hand to
avoid grappling with the inconsistency.
VI. CONCLUSION
United States v. Pend Oreille County P.U.D. No. 164 proves
that Indian tribes have not given up the fight against states over
ownership of submerged lands on or within reservation bounda-
ries. When the Supreme Court, in Montana v. United States,"B
made assertion of ownership based on treaties overly burdensome,
the Kalispel Tribe of western Washington State responded in
Pend Oreille by arguing from aboriginal title. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington sustained
the Tribe's claim. Judge Bilby ruled that aboriginal title encum-
bers the federal government's fee in the bedlands6 6 When the
71 (1982), foreclosed further treaty-making with Indian Tribes.
62. See Pend Oreille, 585 F. Supp. at 609, citing United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905). On the requirements for asserting aboriginal rights see supra
note 30.
63. See supra note 31. It cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy
how many tribes retain aboriginal rights today. The very existence of such rights
is often unclear until litigated.
64. 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
65. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
66. See supra notes 29 and 36-40 and accompanying text.
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United States subsequently conveys its title to newly admitted
states under the Equal Footing Doctrine, the encumbrance
follows.6 7
The premise of Pend Oreille-that aboriginal title encumbers
the federal government's fee-is inconsistent with the Montana
Court's presumption that the United States holds full title to the
bedlands before statehood. This inconsistency indicates the Su-
preme Court's failure to consider the possible effect of aboriginal
rights on the government's fee in its Montana ruling. Ironically, it
is Judge Bilby's decision that is placed in jeopardy by that incon-
sistency. If the Kalispel Tribe succeeds on the merits,6" the Ninth
Circuit will likely affirm.6 9 The inconsistency with Montana
could, however, be fatal if the case were to rise to a Supreme
Court predisposed to states rights. That would create the ulti-
mate irony: The law of aboriginal Indian title upended by a faulty
presumption in a decision where aboriginal rights were not at
issue.
67. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
69. The Ninth Circuit has been recognized for its "broad interpretation" of
the Montana ruling. Note, Montana v. United States-Effects on Liberal Treaty
Interpretation and Indian Rights to Lands Underlying Navigable Waters, supra
note 8, at 703. Of the seven treaty-based bedlands claim cases, six have been in
the Ninth Circuit. Tribal claimants have prevailed in all but one of those six. See
supra note 19. The lone exception is United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654 (9th
Cir. 1983), which demonstrated the fallibility of the Ninth Circuit. See Comment,
supra note 3, at 138.
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